Adopting, Using, and Discarding Paper and Electronic Payment Instruments: Variation by Age and Race by Mann, Ronald J.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2011 
Adopting, Using, and Discarding Paper and Electronic Payment 
Instruments: Variation by Age and Race 
Ronald J. Mann 
Columbia Law School, rmann@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, Law and Race Commons, and the Law and Society 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ronald J. Mann, Adopting, Using, and Discarding Paper and Electronic Payment Instruments: Variation by 
Age and Race, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON PUBLIC POLICY DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 11-2 (2011). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1696 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 






Adopting, Using, and Discarding Paper and 
Electronic Payment Instruments: 
Variation by Age and Race  
Ronald J. Mann 
 
Abstract: 
This paper uses data from the 2008 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice to discuss the adoption, 
use, and discarding of various common payment instruments. Using a nationally representative 
sample of individual-level data, it presents evidence in unparalleled detail about how 
consumers use different payment instruments. Most interestingly, it displays robust evidence of 
significant age- and race-related differences in payments choices. Among other things, it 
suggests that the range of payment instruments adopted and regularly used by blacks is 
narrower than that chosen by whites, presumably because of relatively limited access to 
financial institutions. With regard to age, it documents pervasive (and complex) age-related 
patterns at every step of the decisions to adopt, use, and discard payment instruments. 
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The most important development in payments in the last half century is the 
steady shift from paper to electronic payments. The increased use of credit cards has 
made retail payments much more efficient, especially for those seeking to make 
purchases with borrowed funds (Evans and Schmalensee 2005; Mann 2006). More 
recently, the shift from checks to debit cards has lowered the transaction costs of 
processing and accelerated the clearing process (Evans and Schmalensee 2005). More 
generally, the shift away from cash to more sophisticated payment instruments has 
facilitated a shift in the way that households hold their assets—from cash (vulnerable to 
loss or theft and bearing no interest) to assets that are much safer and much more likely 
to produce a return for those that hold them. 
Unfortunately, the limitations of existing survey instruments have made it 
difficult to understand the details of the ongoing shift from paper to electronic payment 
instruments. This paper presents data from the Boston Federal Reserve’s 2008 Survey of 
Consumer Payment Choice (SCPC), the first publicly available, nationally representative 
survey with comprehensive and detailed information about consumer payments 
choices.  
Data from the 2008 survey document the growing dominance of electronic 
payment instruments. To offer some of the most telling points, in addition to cash and 
checks, more than 80 percent of consumers have now adopted credit cards or debit 
cards. With respect to retail payments, the share of plastic (credit cards, debit cards, and 
prepaid cards) is now 53 percent, as opposed to only 37 percent for paper-based 
payment methods (predominantly cash and checks). And in the category of bill 
payments, once overwhelmingly dominated by checks, payment cards and other 
electronic methods (electronic bank account deductions (EBAD),1 online-banking bill-
pay (OBBP), or automatic deduction) now are used for 75 percent of all bill payments. 
The shift to electronics is not uniform, however, for the data document marked 
differences in payments choices throughout the population. Among other things, the 
data suggest that the range of payment instruments adopted and regularly used by 
blacks is narrower than that chosen by whites, apparently because of relatively limited 
access to financial institutions. Most importantly, the data suggest pervasive (and 
                                                       
1 Because of difficulties in applying the EBAD concept, the 2009 survey replaces “EBAD” with the concept of 
the “bank account number payment” or BANP. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1862169
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complex) age-related patterns at every step of the decisions to adopt, use, and discard 
payment instruments. 
The body of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly discusses the 
SCPC—how it was collected, what it includes, and how it compares with other 
nationally representative surveys such as the SCF. Section 3 summarizes the data about 
adoption of payment instruments. The data show stark race- and age-based variation, 
much of which persists even in multivariate analysis. Section 4 summarizes the data 
about the success of payment instruments—how often they are used and how often 
consumers decide to stop or limit their use. As with Section 3, multivariate analysis 
suggests that race- and age-based variation is important in understanding consumer 
payments choices. Finally, Section 5 discusses the most novel data from the SCPC—data 
about which payment instruments are used for which types of payments. The data in 
this section show that the shift from paper to electronics has proceeded in quite different 
directions for different types of payments, and that identifiably distinct groups of 
consumers are making quite different types of payments choices. Section 6 briefly 
concludes. 
2 Data and Methods 
2.1 Survey Methods 
The SCPC is a nationally representative survey of consumer payment behavior, 
using an instrument developed by the Consumer Payments Research Center (CPRC) of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. The RAND Corporation administered the SCPC in 
the fall of 2008 to 1,010 respondents as a module of its American Life Panel. The survey 
was administered online, either by computer or by Web TV, and took approximately 
one-half hour to complete. 
Recognizing the likely differences between the respondent sample and the 
general population, RAND constructs sampling weights designed to make the sample as 
representative of the population as possible. As discussed in more detail in Foster, 
Meijer, Schuh, and Zabek (2009), RAND uses benchmark distributions derived from the 
March 2008 Current Population Survey (CPS), which should cause the weighted SCPC 
data to match the population with respect to gender, age, race, education, and income. 
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The survey instrument includes detailed questions about the adoption, use, and 
discarding of nine different payment instruments: cash, checks, money orders, traveler’s 
checks, debit cards, credit cards, prepaid cards, OBBP, and EBAD.  For purposes of the 
SCPC, OBBP includes transactions in which a bill payment is made directly from a bank 
account, without using a check or a debit card, and initiated by a consumer using the 
bank’s online banking bill pay application. EBAD, by contrast, involves an electronic 
payment in which the consumer provides a bank account number and routing 
information to a third party that uses the information to obtain funds without the use of 
a check. Transactions processed by an intermediary (such as PayPal) are treated as made 
by the underlying payment system that the intermediary accesses (usually credit card, 
debit card, or EBAD). 
The survey also includes questions about which payment instruments are used 
for which types of transactions (paying bills, retail purchases, online purchases, and 
services). Finally, of particular interest to scholars interested in understanding the 
development and success of emerging payment instruments, the survey asks a set of 
detailed questions about the importance consumers attribute to various characteristics of 
payments (ease of acquisition, acceptance, timing, cost, security, etc.). 
2.2 Relation to the SCF 
Because the purpose of the SCPC is to permit inferences about the use of 
payment instruments in the general population, it is important at the outset to consider 
the quality of the sample with respect to financial characteristics. A useful way to 
consider this is to compare the results with those of the Federal Reserve’s Survey of 
Consumer Finances (SCF), a triennial survey of the balance sheet, pension, income, and 
other demographic characteristics of U.S. families that has been conducted since 1983 
and currently has a staff and budget an order of magnitude greater than those of the 
SCPC. As scholarship about the SCF emphasizes, high levels of U.S. income and wealth 
inequality make it quite difficult to obtain a sample that accurately reflects the 
population’s distribution on those characteristics (Bucks et al. 2009; Kennickell 2008), 
making it especially important to attempt to validate the quality of the SCPC data.  
To be sure, the comparison is at best rough. For example, the SCPC is a 
consumer-level survey, while the SCF collects information at the household level. 
Therefore, direct comparisons of financial information between the surveys are 
necessarily at least slightly misleading. The variable that is most useful to compare is 
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income, because the SCPC takes advantage of other RAND panel data to “gross up” 
consumer-level income data to the household level. 
 
Figure 1 suggests that the lower and upper ends of the distribution are 
underrepresented, at least as compared with the SCF, while the middle part of the 
distribution is overrepresented. It is not surprising that the SCPC distribution diverges 
from the SCF at the ends of both tails, given the intense effort SCF investigators expend 
in locating and obtaining information from individuals in those positions (including 
obtaining assistance from the IRS in locating high-income individuals) (Bucks et al. 2009; 
Kennickell 2008).  
Given the difference in timing (the last SCF was administered in 2007, while the 
SCPC discussed in this paper was administered in 2008) and the differences in the 
definition of income (discussed in Foster et al. 2009), it is not surprising that there would 
be some divergence. However, the distributions appear sufficiently similar to validate 
exploring the SCPC data, particularly across the interior part of the income breakdown, 
for which payment choices are most important. This is particularly true when we 
consider some of the advantages that the SCPC has over the SCF. Most obviously, 






<25K 25 50K 50 75K 75 100K 100 125K >125K
Income Categories
SCPC SCF
Author’s calculations from 2007 SCF (n=4418) and 2008 SCPC (n=1001). Figure displays %
of households(SCF)/consumers(SCPC) with income at indicated levels.
Figure 1: Income Distribution for SCF and SCPC
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subsequent years it will enable relatively short-term longitudinal analysis that cannot 
practicably be conducted with the SCF. Moreover, even with the first year’s data (the 
subject of this paper), the consumer-level data on payments are much more detailed 
than the parallel data available in the SCF. 
3 Adoption of Payment Instruments 
Logically, the first topic to address about the choices consumers make with 
regard to payments is which instruments they have adopted and why.  
3.1 The Extent of Adoption 
This section analyzes the SCPC data on adoption by presenting summary 
descriptive data, simple cross-tabulations to document the relevance of demographic 
variation, a summary of the data on reasons for payment choice, and finally a logistic 
regression estimating the significance of the demographic and reasons data. It begins by 
noting the contribution of the SCPC dataset to understanding the adoption of various 
payment instruments.  
Given the ongoing policy controversies about credit cards (Bar-Gill and Warren 
2008; Mann 2006; Mann 2007) and the obvious cost savings associated with the ongoing 
decline in check use (Federal Reserve 2010; Mann 2011), it is surprising how little 
information is available about the success of various payment instruments in 
penetrating the market. Several data sources offer reliable estimates of the total volume 
for particular instruments—the Federal Reserve for checks and the Nilson Report for 
credit and debit cards being the most prominent. And the SCF includes data about 
financial participation that summarize adoption of a few of the most common payments 
instruments. But the SCPC is the first dataset to collect in a single place comparable data 
for all commonly used payment instruments. And the fact that it is being collected 
annually, using a panel of respondents, makes it an invaluable contribution to our 
understanding of even the most basic comparative data about all of the instruments.  
3.1.1 Summary Descriptive Data  
Figure 2 displays the aggregate adoption data for each of the eight instruments 
other than cash (on the assumption that all consumers have adopted cash as a payment 
instrument). Figure 3 aggregates these data (plus data on cash) into three groups of 
instruments: paper (cash, check, money order, traveler’s check), cards (debit, credit, 















Source: 2008 SCPC.  Percentage of consumers adopting the listed instrument.  N=977 1002
Figure 2: Adoption of Payment Instruments




Source: 2008 SCPC.  Percentage of consumers adopting the listed category
of instrument.  N=996 1002




Several points of interest are apparent. For one thing, the rapid rise of debit 
cards—rarely used just 15 years ago2—has led to their adoption by even more 
consumers than those who have adopted credit cards. This is particularly surprising 
given the first-mover advantage the existing payment systems had when debit cards 
first became generally available. As Evans and Schmalensee (2007) (among others) have 
explained, the logistics of gaining market share among both cardholders and merchants 
at roughly the same time present an enormous challenge that many entrepreneurs have 
failed: to successfully deploy a new payment system. Two-sided networks necessary for 
the successful deployment of new payment instruments give existing instruments a 
powerful first-mover advantage. Although a complete discussion of the rise of debit is 
beyond the scope of this paper, a big part of the explanation lies in the ability of Visa 
and MasterCard to leverage their existing credit card networks to accelerate the market 
deployment of debit cards; that is why signature debit (issued by Visa and MasterCard 
members) rose much more rapidly than PIN debit (processed predominantly on the 
smaller regional ATM networks). Also, in recent years at least, rising consumer concerns 
about problems associated with credit card use (discussed in the next section) surely 
have accelerated the move toward debit card adoption. To be sure, regulatory hostility 
to debit cards as reflected in the Dodd-Frank Act may lessen the attractiveness of debit 
cards to consumers, especially if it leads to more limited issuance of debit cards or 
increased fees for their use, but for now at least their penetration is remarkable. 
Similarly, the burgeoning use of ACH transactions has pushed EBAD into the 
top tier of payment instruments. Recognizing that this is a payment system that makes 
sense only for consumers with bank accounts, an adoption rate of 73.4 percent reflects a 
remarkably high level of penetration. The fact that more than 80 percent of consumers 
use either OBBP or EBAD suggests an impressive uptake of ACH-based payments since 
the reforms of the last decade broadened the permissible uses of ACH.3 Finally, the low 
                                                       
2 Nilson Report data indicate that in 1996 Americans used debit cards in only eight transactions per capita, 
compared with 59 credit card transactions per capita. 
3 SCPC researchers have explained to me that there also is a possibility that the 2008 results overstate the 
extent of EBAD adoption because of some confusion in responding to the survey instrument. The 2009 
results support this conjecture, as they show a 56 percent adoption rate for BANP (bank account number 
payment, which replaced EBAD in the 2009 survey) in 2009, much lower than the 73 percent reported here 
for EBAD in 2008. At least in part, however, the decline seems to relate to security concerns driving 
consumer abandonment of EBAD/BANP, rather than measurement error in 2008. 
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levels of money orders and traveler’s checks document the marginalization of these once 
systemically important instruments by the rise of the payment card.4 
3.1.2 Demographic Variation 
Because the SCPC includes consumer-level data from a nationally representative 
sample, it is useful to examine how adoption rates differ based on demographic 
characteristics of the consumer. The SCPC encompasses a wide variety of demographic 
information, including information about age, race, gender, education, income, net 
worth, employment, homeownership, marital status, and structure of the household. 
Given the size of the dataset (approximately 1000 observations), it is not practical to 
distinguish definitively the relative effects of each of these characteristics. For purposes 
of this introductory paper, I emphasize age and race.  
The existing literature offers obvious reasons why race might be associated with 
payments-related choices. Among other things, it seems likely that limited access to 
banking services for blacks is at least a partial explanation (Scholz and Seshadri 2009: 
43–46; Barr 2009: 71–76; Osili and Paulson 2007; Mann 2009: 272–78; Mann and Mann 
2011). This could be so either because blacks have less access to conventional deposit 
relationships (and thus turn to nondeposit products, including money orders, stored-
value cards, and traveler’s checks) or because they have less robust relationships with 
the banks where they deposit their funds (and therefore are less likely to use the deposit-
related products available to them—checks and debit cards). 
The literature also suggests obvious reasons why people of different ages might 
make different payments choices. This could be a cohort effect—if payments choices are 
driven in large part by habits formed in youth, older consumers will be less likely than 
younger consumers to use instruments that became common in recent decades (Ching 
2010). Or it could be an artifact of age itself, reflecting differing attitudes to risk or the 
like related to the differing positions in the life course (Aguiar and Hurst 2007; Mann 
and Mann 2011). 
Although the choice is inherently a judgment call, the limitation of the scope of 
this paper to these characteristics rests on the sense that disparities related to age and 
race are analytically important even when they reflect underlying variations in other 
characteristics such as income, net worth, or education (Mann and Mann 2011). I note 
                                                       
4 To get a sense of how far these systems have fallen, consider Nilson Report data indicating 41 million 




the decision not to analyze gender separately. Although a substantial literature supports 
the likelihood of gender-related differences in risk aversion (Sapienza et al. 2009; 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek 1998; Byrnes et al. 1999; Borghans et al. 2009; Bajtelsmit and 
Bernasek 1996), it seems likely that many payments choices are made at the household 
level. To get a crisp look at gender-related differences, we would need a sample limited 
to single-person households of different genders. Given the size of the SCPC sample, it is 
not practical to analyze gender in that way. Accordingly, I have adopted the strategy of 
analyzing only age and race, and using household composition as a control.  
For illustrative purposes, the panels of Figure 45 summarize the adoption of the 
various instruments by race; the panels of Figure 5 summarize the adoption of credit 
and debit cards by age. As Figure 5 shows, age is apparently quite important in 
explaining payment card adoption. 
 
 
                                                       
5 The bivariate tabulations in Figures 4 and 5 (and the similar figures later in the paper) reflect confidence 
intervals generated by Stata’s “ci” command, which calculates Clopper-Pearson binomial confidence 


































































Source: 2008 SCPC.  Graphs show weighted mean percentage of consumers adopting the listed instrument
with 5% confidence intervals.  N ranges from 977 1002.




3.2 Reasons for Payments Adoption 
To help make sense of the data on adoption, it is useful to consider the most 
innovative aspect of the SCPC data, information about the importance consumers 
attribute to various aspects of payment functionality. This information is unequalled in 
its breadth and detail. See Bucks et al. (2009) (parallel data about checks based on the 
2007 SCF). Figure 6 displays data about the percentage of consumers who regard each of 























Source: 2008 SCPC.  Graphs show weighted mean percentage of consumers adopting the listed instrument
with 95% confidence intervals.  N=1001 (DC), 1000 (CC).




Taken together, the information about how often particular attributes are at the 
top or the bottom of consumers’ preferences tells us a great deal about how payment 
instruments compete against one another.  Most obviously, it is clear that consumers 
care a great deal about security: this is selected by most respondents as most important 
and almost never (by fewer than 1 percent) selected as least important 
Close behind security is ease of use—which is selected by almost as many 
consumers as the most important characteristic and rarely selected (by fewer than 5 
percent) as the least important characteristic. Conversely, it is noteworthy how little 
consumers care about difficulties of acquiring and setting up an instrument and about 
acceptance. Collectively, this suggests that consumers are much more interested in a 
simple payment experience (the plastic card probably being the leader on this 
characteristic), even if it requires carrying multiple instruments for different purposes.  
3.3 Multivariate Analysis 
Multivariate analysis helps to illuminate the substance of the relationships 
involved. Although I experimented with models that included a wide range of 
demographic controls (income, net wealth, education, marital status, and the like), 
ultimately (as discussed above) I settled on estimating relationships that include only 




















Source: 2008 SCPC.  Weighted percentage of consumers identifying the listed attribute
as most (or least) important.  N=1003 (most), 1005 (least)
Figure 6: Consumer Ranking of Importance of Attributes of Payment Instruments
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race and age, with household status, education, income, and adoption of other 
instruments as controls. I also estimated models with interactions of the demographic 
variables, and with a linear age variable, but none of them significantly changed the 
simpler models summarized below. The reference category for the model is a white 
individual between the ages of 35 and 44. Although I estimated equations for all eight of 
the noncash payment instruments, I report here only results for five instruments: checks, 
debit cards, credit cards, stored-value cards, and OBBP. I omit cash, traveler’s checks, 
and money orders (for which adoption is either almost universal or quite uncommon) 
and also EBAD (which is quite similar to OBBP). Table 1 summarizes the results of 
logistic regression of adoption of the various payments instruments on limited 
demographic controls.6 The reference category is a white individual aged 35–44, married 
with no children, with a college education and an annual income of about $60,000.  
TABLE 1: LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF ADOPTION RATES OF 
LEADING PAYMENT INSTRUMENTS ON DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
Demographic 
Variables 
Check7 Debit Card Credit Card Stored-
Value Card 
OBBP 
Black   -.08 (.02)** -.03 (.04)   -.06 (.03)#  -.12 (.06)#  -.11 (.06)# 
<25 .03 (.04) .09 (.08) -.03 (.04) .06 (.07) -.01 (.09) 
25-34 -.01 (.03) -.03 (.05) .02 (.03) -.01 (.05) -.01 (.06) 
45-54 .01 (.03)  -.13 (.04)**  .06 (.03)# -.01 (.04)    -.17 (.05)** 
55-64 .03 (.03)  -.15 (.05)**   .09 (.03)**  .01 (.04)     -.20 (.05)** 
65+ --   -.18 (.05)**   .17 (.04)** -.01 (.05)     -.19 (.06)** 
N 497 952 951 932 947 
Dependent variable is adoption of the listed instrument. The table displays average marginal 
effects for an estimation using robust standard errors. Controls for household structure, income, 
and education omitted. # - 0.10, * - 0.05, ** - 0.01. Bold-faced type—significance at 0.1 level or 
better. 
In general, the models provide evidence consistent with the existing literature. 
Most obviously, consistent with the discussion above related to financial participation, 
blacks are significantly less likely to use all of the products summarized here except for 
debit cards. Cross-tabulation with use of a checking account strongly suggests the 
accuracy of this intuition: when I reran the models in the last four columns of Table 1 
limited to those with checking accounts, blacks did not differ significantly from whites 
                                                       
6 Because of the size of the sample, the regressions in this paper omit all races except white and black, use 
white as the reference class, and include black as an independent variable. A complete set of the output is 
available upon request. 
7 The number of observations for the check regression is small because several classes of data are dropped 
for collinearity (including those over 65 and those with income over $100,000). 
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for any instrument. I also estimated an alternate set of models controlling for the type of 
institution at which the primary bank account is located. The coefficients on the race 
variable in those models were substantially the same as those in the models shown in 
Table 1, suggesting that it is not the type of institution that blacks use that causes this 
differential access. I also explored the possibility that attitudinal variations related to 
payment instruments might explain the differential, by estimating models that included 
as controls the information related to affinity for particular characteristics of payment 
instruments (security, control, ease of use, etc.). Again, the coefficients on race in those 
models were similar to those in the models summarized below. In the end, the analysis 
sheds relatively little light on precisely what is causing blacks to shy away from noncash 
payment instruments, but it does suggest that it is closely related to whatever is keeping 
them from using mainstream institutions like checking accounts (a subject explored in 
detail by Caskey 1996). 
With respect to age, the models suggest significant age-related variation for 
several of the instruments. Figure 7 provides a graphic coefficient display illustrating the 
substantial size of the effects. Specifically, consumers over the age of 45 appear 
significantly less likely to use debit cards and OBBP, even controlling for race, 
household status, income, and education (second and fifth panels of Figure 7). This 
suggests that mainstream adoption of debit cards and OBBP is still largely cohort-based, 
and is only now reaching those over 45. 
The contrary age-related effect on credit cards (third panel of Figure 7) is 
particularly noteworthy in light of the persistent efforts of credit card issuers to market 
their products to the young, especially college students (Mann 2006; Manning 2000). 
Although this effect might in part reflect the limited share of those at younger ages to 
whom credit cards are marketed, it still suggests at least the possibility of a cohort effect 
—the younger generation is more attracted to debit cards than their elders are and more 




Perhaps the most interesting finding from this regression is that checking use, 
once we include the controls, is not nearly so age-sensitive as debit card and OBBP use. 
To put it another way, variations in race, household status, income, and education 
largely explain the limited variation in access to checking accounts at various ages.  
4 Success of Payment Instruments 
Data about adoption tell us a great deal about the market penetration of various 
products, but they tell us relatively little about the success of a payment instrument. For 
that, we need to know the extent to which it is used: it is not enough for a consumer to 
have a checkbook if he or she uses it only on rare occasions. Therefore, I turn now to the 
SCPC data about how often consumers use particular instruments and, having started to 
use them, how often  they become disaffected and substantially limit their further use. 
4.1 Use of Payment Instruments 
4.1.1 Summary Descriptive Data 
I considered a number of different metrics to analyze the intensity of consumer 






































1.5 1 .5 0 .5 1
OBBP
Source: 2008 SCPC.  N ranges from 497 952. Graphs display unexponentiated logistic coefficients with 95% confidence intervals.
Reference class is white, married with no children, 35 44, college education, $60K annual income.
Omitting household structure, educational, and income controls.
Figure 7: Age, Race, and Adoption of Payment Instruments
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number of transactions for which each instrument is used in a typical month. For a 
number of reasons, however, I rejected that measure. One problem is that it necessarily 
will weight more heavily use by people with more economic activity (because they make 
more payments). Another problem is that it would be likely (especially in regressions) to 
give undue weight to outliers with extreme levels of use.  More generally, because the 
purpose of this analysis is to assess the relative levels of consumer demand for the 
different instruments, analysis of shares (rather than transaction volume) is likely to 
provide a more reliable estimate (see Schuh & Stavins 2010). Accordingly, I decided to 
use a variable that measures the share of all payments made with any particular 
instrument. Thus, this measure sums to 1.0 for each consumer for all payments together; 
a consumer who uses only cash and credit cards might have 0.4 for cash and 0.6 for 
credit cards. I report first (Figure 8) the share of transactions for each instrument. I 
include not only the eight systems discussed under adoption, but also cash and direct 
deductions from income. Cash is not considered in the adoption section because all 
consumers (presumably) have adopted it. Salary deduction is not included in the SCPC 
adoption data, presumably, because a consumer does not “adopt” it in the same way as 
he adopts mainstream instruments. 
 
0 .1 .2 .3
T/C








Source: 2008 SCPC.  Weighted mean share of payments made with
listed instrument.  N=894 988
Figure 8: Shares of Use of Payment Instruments
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These data start to show what the adoption data obscure, the dominance that 
electronic payment instruments (payment cards in particular) have developed in recent 
years. Although the data discussed in Section 3 show that almost all consumers still 
adopt checks, we see here clearly that the share of check use is not only smaller than the 
share of cash, but also smaller than the share of either debit cards or credit cards.  
Another interesting data point relates to check use as compared with the use of 
OBBP and EBAD payments that might serve as substitutes. The mean share of checks is 
now down to 17.5 percent. The mean share of OBBP and EBAD is now up to 12.5 
percent—still less, but not by much. The question is not whether, but when, use of these 
developing instruments will surpass use of checks. 
4.1.2 Demographic Variation 
As with the adoption of payment instruments, there is good reason to expect 
demographic variation in the intensity of use. To illustrate the point as a prelude to the 
multivariate analysis below, Figures 9 and 10 summarize the shares of the different 










































































Source: 2008 SCPC.  Graphs show weighted mean shares of payments made with the listed instrument
with 95% confidence intervals.  N ranges from 894 988.




4.1.3 Multivariate Analysis 
As with the analysis of adoption, multivariate analysis illuminates the extent to 
which the bivariate patterns apparent above (especially in Figure 10) are artifacts of the 
sample or instead reflect substantial variations. As with the regressions above, the 
reference category is a white individual aged 35–44, married with no children, with a 
college education and an annual income of about $60,000. To deal with the apparent 
effects of the share of adoption of other instruments on payments, the regressions 
include as additional controls dummies for the number of other instruments adopted by 
each user (see Schuh & Stavins 2010 [methodological discussion]).8 Although the 
regressions summarized in Figure 119 suggest that the variation in the use of cash related 
to age and race is unimportant, each of the other instruments shows significant 
substantive effects related to age and race. 
                                                       
8 To account for the possibility of selection effects related to adoption, I, like Schuh & Stavins, also estimated 
a set of Heckman two-step equations.  













































Source: 2008 SCPC.  Graphs show weighted mean share of payments made with the listed instrument,
with 95% confidence intervals.  N= 965 987.




The working hypothesis, drawn from the steady decline of checks in recent 
years, would be that age is the most important predictor, with older age brackets 
showing higher rates of check use. As summarized in the second panel of Figure 11, the 
data show a strong connection between age and check use, even when controlling for 
race, income, household structure, education, and other instrument adoptions. 
Individuals ages 35–44 use checks significantly more than those who are younger, and 
those above middle age use checks even more. Although the model does not explain a 
large share of the variation in check use (the R-squared is less than 5 percent), the size of 
the age effects is substantial. The first panel of Figure 12 displays the predicted shares of 
check use, by age, with 95 percent confidence intervals, to illustrate the substantiality of 
the shift through the life course. As the figure shows, the share of payments made by 
check rises from less than 20 percent for individuals under 25 to almost 35 percent for 
those 55–64 years of age; conversely, the share made with debit cards falls from more 
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Credit Cards
Source: 2008 SCPC.  N ranges from 920 940. Graphs display OLS coefficients with 95% confidence intervals.
Reference class is white, married with no children, 35 44, college education, $60K annual income.
Omitting household structure, educational, income, and use of other instrument controls.





Turning to electronic payments, the two bottom panels of Figure 11 show the age 
and race coefficients for debit and credit cards, respectively. Blacks’ use of debit cards is 
higher than whites’; blacks’ use of credit cards is lower. The age pattern of credit cards, 
however, is much less stable than the bivariate shares in Figure 10 suggest: the 
increasing share of payments made with credit cards by older consumers is explained, to 
a large degree, by race, income, and education controls. But for debit cards, the opposite 
is true. If anything, the age effect is even clearer in the multivariate analysis illustrated in 
Figure 11 than in the cross-tabulation illustrated in Figure 10. The contrast with checks 
in Figure 12 shows the major point: check share increases markedly with age, while 
debit card share declines. If we accept the premise that debit cards are socially preferable 
to checks (because of the lower external costs, shorter clearance time, and lower fraud 
losses), then it is noteworthy that the “better” social choice for both instruments is made 
by the younger and the “worse” choice is made by the older. 
I explored the possibility that debit card use is operating largely as an age-related 
substitute for checks—so that the sum of debit card and check shares would be flat over 
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Debit Cards
Source: 2008 SCPC.  N = 938 (checks), 937 (debit cards). Graphs display predicted payment shares with 95% confidence intervals.
Reference class is white, married with no children, 35 44, college education, $60K annual income.
Omitting household structure, educational, income, and use of other instrument controls.
Figure 12: Predicted Share of Payments (By Age)
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comprehensively, it appears that a considerable portion of the debit-card variation by 
age is not explained by check use.10  
4.2 Discarding Payment Instruments 
One of the most interesting features of the SCPC data is information about 
consumers who have become disenchanted with a particular payment instrument. The 
SCPC collects two pieces of information on this point: whether users have discarded a 
particular payment instrument, and whether they report decreased use of the 
instrument during recent years. The two data points are likely to reflect different types 
of an individual’s dissatisfaction: discarding an instrument might reflect an affirmative 
concern about negative attributes; decreased use might reflect a more passive 
determination that superior alternatives are available. Together they help to illuminate 
the choices consumers make about payments. 
4.2.1 Summary Descriptive Data  
Figure 13 starts by showing two metrics of dissatisfaction. The first panel reports 
the ratio of those discarding an instrument to the total number of users; the second, the 
ratio of those decreasing their use of the instrument to the total number of users.  
 
                                                       
10A parallel effort related to cash (exploring the possibility that check share plus cash share would equal 
debit card share) was similarly inconclusive. It may well be that longitudinal data available in future years 
from the SCPC will shed more light on the substitution question. 















Source: 2008 SCPC.  Weighted ratio of (a) consumers reporting specified decline in use of listed instrument
to (b) users of listed instrument.  N=977 1010
Figure 13: Declining Use of Payment Instruments
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The data suggest three distinct groups based on consumer satisfaction. The first 
group comprises the instruments with which consumers responding to the 2008 survey 
generally seemed satisfied: debit cards, EBAD, and OBBP, with few users reporting that 
they were discarding or decreasing their use. The second group includes the instruments 
with which consumers indicated that they were particularly dissatisfied: cash, checks, 
and stored value cards. Even heavy users of these instruments were likely to have 
reported that their use was declining. Among this group, the decline in check use is not 
surprising, because it is well known. What is more interesting is that consumers 
reported that they were decreasing their use of cash as well.  Whether this is because of 
the increased ease of using payment cards for small retail transactions or because of 
concerns about crime and safety (see Mann 2006) is hard to say. 
Similarly, the dissatisfaction with stored value cards is surprising because this 
instrument is so new that its adoption has been growing rapidly. Apparently, a large 
share of those who starting to use this product rapidly stopped using it, presumably 
because they decided that the fees associated with use were too high (Chakravorti and 
Lubasi 2006). It is also possible, though, that the reported decreasing use is an artifact of 
nonreloadable gift cards; the recipient of such a card might use it heavily then stop using 
the instrument when the card was fully redeemed. Therefore, these data may overstate 
the extent of dissatisfaction with stored value cards. Because of these concerns I do not 
explore further the data about dissatisfaction with stored-value cards. 
The most interesting item is credit cards, which seem to belong to a group of 
their own: A high share of users reported discarding and decreasing use, suggesting that 
many users were actively disaffected, but intense users were not decreasing their use 
significantly.  The contrast between credit cards and all other payment systems warrants 
closer attention. 
4.2 Demographic Variation 
Demographic breakdowns (summarized in Figures 14 and 15) help to illuminate 
the groups that are driving the decreasing use of cash, checks, and credit cards 
summarized above. The data suggest the possibility of important variation by race and 





Multivariate analysis helps to illuminate the relationships among the various 
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Source: 2008 SCPC.  Graphs show weighted mean percentage of consumers with declining use of
(or discarding) the listed instrument, with 5% confidence intervals.  N ranges from 1000 1010.
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Source: 2008 SCPC.  Graphs show weighted mean percentage of consumers with declining use of
(or discarding) the listed instrument, with 5% confidence intervals.  N ranges from 999 1009.
Figure 15: Declining Use of Payment Instruments by Age
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indicate whether their use of each particular instrument was increasing, staying the 
same, or decreasing, it seems appropriate for purposes of multivariate analysis of 
dissatisfaction with instruments to include the full range of responses. Although I 
considered an ordered logit model, it quickly became apparent that the three responses 
are not, strictly speaking, ordered; older consumers, for example, seem less likely to 
have reported any change (whether increase or decrease). Accordingly, I settled on a 
multinomial logit model, summarized in Figure 16.11 Because these models include data 
on increased use and decreased use, I added debit cards for comparison. The panels of 
Figure 16 display first the coefficients for increased use and then the coefficients for 
decreased use (both relative to the baseline of no change). As with the regressions above, 
the reference category is a white individual, married with no children, with a college 
education and an annual income of about $60,000; controls for income, education, 
household structure, and adoption of other instruments are omitted. 
 
The multivariate analysis suggests little in the way of substantial relationship to 
race and age. As suggested above, change of any kind is more common for young 
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Credit Card Decline
Source: 2008 SCPC.  N ranges from 950 960. Graphs display unexponentiated logistic coefficients with 95% confidence intervals.
Multinomial logistic regression of increased use, constant use, and declining use.  Reference class is white, married with no children,
35 44, college education, $60K annual income.  Omitting household structure, educational, and income controls.
Figure 16: Multinomial Analysis of Age, Race,
and Changes in Use of Payment Instruments
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households than for the old: the coefficient is marginally or significantly negative for 
consumers over 64 in each of the models. This suggests that declining use relates more 
to a settled pattern of use than to any particular taste for (or against) particular 
instruments. With respect to race, whites are less likely to increase (or decrease) use than 
blacks: the coefficients for blacks are marginally or significantly positive for each of the 
models with the exception of credit cards; and there the large standard error makes it 
difficult to discern any substantial race effect in the changing use of credit cards. 
5 Payments Choices 
Another novel type of information in the SCPC relates to the types of 
transactions in which different payment instruments were used, according to the 2008 
survey. For purposes of this paper, I distinguish four types of payment transactions: bill 
payments, online purchases, retail purchases, and services. Figure 17 illustrates how 
frequently each of the different instruments was used to make each of those four types 
of payments. The principal hypothesis to investigate is the significance of demographic 
variation in the continuing use of checks for bill payments and retail purchases. The 
discussion above suggests a likelihood of significant race and age effects. 
 































Source: 2008 SCPC.  Weighted percentage of specified transaction type using listed instrument. N=1010
Figure 17: Payment Instrument Use by Transaction Type
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Several things about Figure 17 are interesting. The first relates to checks. As the 
retail panel shows, checks were used quite rarely (5 percent) in retail transactions—the 
type of transaction where pressures of time and convenience are most important. They 
are, to be sure, still much more common in other contexts, but they are now rare at the 
retail counter where they once dominated (Federal Reserve 2010). The second point of 
interest relates to paper bill payments. In that context, paper (including checks and cash) 
was used for only a quarter of bill payments, a remarkable shift from a generation ago. 
One oddity of the data is the report that checks were used for 25 percent of online 
payments. Based on the survey questions, this apparently represents offline use of 
checks mailed to pay for online purchases. The final point of interest relates to the rise of 
debit cards, both online and at retail. Where credit cards dominated online purchases 
only 10 years ago (when they were the only practical option), the successful deployment 
of signature-based debit cards spurred their use online to such an extent that in 2008 
debit cards were used about 40 percent more often for those transactions than credit 
cards (30 percent versus 22 percent). The same was true at retail, where debit cards were 
used almost twice as often (39 percent versus 22 percent) as credit cards. Given the 
complex policy concerns raised by the routine use of credit cards (Mann 2006), and 
reflected in the CARD Act, the relative dominance of debit cards in those contexts is 
noteworthy. As with the declining use data above, this underscores the shift by 
consumers away from credit in contexts where the debit alternative is practical. It 
remains to be seen whether the adverse effects of Dodd-Frank on the debit card market 
will reverse that trend. 
It is also interesting to consider how the breakdown of use for different 
transaction types relates to credit card adoption (Figures 18 and 19). The most surprising 
point is the concentration of retail12 check use among those who did not adopt credit 
cards. I would have expected those who did not use credit cards to be primarily debit 
card users. Interestingly, however, where check use was an order of magnitude larger 
for non-adopters (19.5 percent versus 1.3 percent), debit card use was roughly the same 
(45 percent versus 38 percent). This suggests that many people have never adopted 
either credit cards or debit cards and continue to pay only with paper.  
                                                       
12 The analysis of retail payment instruments in this section does not include online payments. The choice of 





The pattern of check use was similar for bill payments, where credit card 







CC Non Adopters CC Adopters
Cash Check Debit Credit SVC Cash Check Debit Credit SVC
Source: 2008 SCPC.  Weighted percentage of retail payments made using listed instrument.
N=1010






CC Non Adopters CC Adopters
CS CK DC CCSVCEB OB Inc M/O CS CK DC CCSVCEB OB Inc M/O
Source: 2008 SCPC.  Weighted percentage of bill payments made using listed instrument.
N=1010
Figure 19: Payment Instrument Shares by Credit Card Adoption (Bill Payment)
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paid their bills with checks almost half (46 percent) of the time. Here, however, debit 
card use also was much larger (40 percent versus 12 percent). What is most interesting is 
the strikingly high share of EBAD and OBBP use among adopters (both more than five 
times as large as among non-adopters). No reason for this disparity is apparent. 
 
 
To explore the continuing use of checks more thoroughly, Figure 20 
summarizes13 the results of an ordinary least squares regression of the share of check use 
for retail and bill payments, with controls for household structure, income, education, 
and adoption of other payment instruments. As with the regressions above, the 
reference category is a white individual, aged 35–44, married with no children, with a 
college education and an annual income of about $60,000. 
The results suggest two things. The most interesting is the relative importance of 
age in explaining check use for bill payments as compared with retail. The first panel of 
Figure 20 looks much more like Figure 12 than the second panel does. Although the age 
effect remains discernible for retail payments, it is (surprisingly) much diluted. The 
regression also suggests substantial race effects. Where Figure 12 suggested no race 
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Retail
Source: 2008 SCPC.  N 903 (Bills) 922 (Retail). Graphs display OLS coefficients with 95% confidence intervals.
Reference class is white, married with no children, 35 44, college education, $60K annual income.
Omitting controls for household structure, education, income, and adoption of other instruments.
Figure 20: Age, Race, and Share of Check Use by Transaction Type
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effect at all for check use in the aggregate, blacks were substantially less likely to use 
checks for bill payments, but for retail payments they were substantially more likely to 
use checks. To get an understanding of the size of the effects, the typical share of check 
use for bill payments was about 20 percent; the share for blacks was about 2.5 
percentage points (13 percent) lower; for retail, where the typical share was about 6 
percent, blacks’ share was about 1.4 percentage points (more than 20 percent) higher. 
Because the regressions control for income, education, household structure, and 
adoption of other instruments, the distinction is difficult to understand. The retail effect 
is not, for example, likely to reflect lack of access to debit cards. Perhaps the longitudinal 
data available from the SCPC in the years to come will shed more light on the problem. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper, of course, only scratches the surface of demographic variation in the 
choices consumers make about payments. Much more work remains to be done to 
understand the underlying causes of the demographic variations documented above. 
The SCPC itself doubtless will contribute to further understanding of all of these 
questions as longitudinal data become available in the years to come. 
For me, the most intriguing of these questions, because it is directly related to 
future developments, is the effect of age. I have emphasized elsewhere the way in which 
the use and risks of credit are patterned by age (Mann and Mann 2011). Each section of 
the paper documents substantial and significant age effects related to payments. But the 
paper does not undertake to determine whether the effects relate to age—the position in 
the life course—or whether they are instead cohort effects—differences in payments 
choices that depend on the nature of payments institutions during the early years of the 
life course for each generation of consumers. Although the different options that become 
available as later cohorts enter the mainstream economy make cohort effects plausible, 
there are strong arguments to support a timeless life-course effect. Most obviously, 
whatever else has changed about financial services in the last three decades, it remains 
true that the young have less access to mainstream financial services than those farther 
along the life course. If anything, the burgeoning use of credit by the young (especially 
college students) increases the share of those under 30 whose credit situation makes it 
harder for them to get full access to mainstream financial services. Although I find these 
questions fascinating, I cannot explore them here, but must be content to hope that this 
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